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We apply spatial econometric techniques to models of state and local fiscal policy 
convergence.  Total tax revenue and expenditures, as well as broad tax and expenditure 
categories, of state and local governments in each of the 48 contiguous U.S. states are 
examined.  We extend work by Scully (1991) and Annala (2003) in much the same way 
that Rey and Montouri (1999) extended the literature dealing with income convergence 
among U.S. states.  Our results indicate that most fiscal policies have been converging 
and exhibit spatial dependence.  A more specific interpretation of our general spatial 
results is that the finding of spatial dependence indicates that the growth paths of state 
and local fiscal policies are not independent.  In addition, we find that total expenditures 
have been converging faster than output, whereas total tax revenues have been 
converging slower that output.  Our models further demonstrate that state expenditure 
growth is dependent upon expenditure growth in economically and demographically 
similar states, while output growth and revenue growth in a state are dependent on output 
growth and revenue growth, respectively, in contiguous states.  
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* The views expressed here are those of the authors and are not necessarily the views of 
the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis or the Federal Reserve System. 
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  Neoclassical growth models as developed by Solow (1956) predict that incomes 
across space (e.g. countries or states) will converge over time.
1  For such convergence to 
occur, lower income jurisdictions must experience higher growth rates than higher 
income jurisdictions.  Convergence as a process of long-run growth has received 






  -convergence or divergence across 
countries (Pritchett, 1997; Hoover and Perez, 2004), Canadian provinces (DeJuan and 
Tomljanovich, 2005), U.S. states (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995; Carlino and Mills, 
1996; Webber et al., 2005), U.S. counties (Bukenya et al., 2002), and geographic regions 
(Miller and Gene, 2005).
2  In the United States, state incomes have generally been 
converging over time, although a temporary divergence was seen in the 1970s and 1980s 
(Coughlin and Mandelbaum, 1988; Carlino and Mills, 1996).  Although estimated speeds 
of convergence depend upon the units of observation and the sample period, studies of 
U.S. states suggest a speed of convergence of roughly two percent a year (Barro and 
Sala-i-Martin, 1995).   
  One potential problem with many of the preceding studies stems from an 
underlying assumption that each cross-sectional unit is independent.  However, as 
discussed in Rey and Montouri (1999) and Abreu et al. (2004), units of observation, such 
                                                 
1 By contrast, endogenous growth models as developed by Romer (1986) allow for divergence. 
2￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿-convergence test for income convergence is done by regressing average annual income growth on 
an initial level of income. A negative value for the estimated coefficient on initial income indicates 
convergence while a positive value indicates divergence.  Another form of convergence, σ−convergence, 
refers to a decline in the standard deviation of income over time.  Work by Fingleton (2003), Magrini 
(2004) and Rey and Janikas (2005) provide surveys of the convergence literature and critiques of the 
various empirical methodologies used.  3 
as states or countries, are typically defined by politically established boundaries rather 
than economic boundaries.  Technology spillovers, migration, trade flows, commuting 
patterns and public policy can link economies together despite their political separation.  
Ignoring the possible spatial interactions between economic units in an empirical model 
may lead to incorrect inferences regarding the magnitude and significance of economic 
variables (Anselin, 1988; Rey and Janikas, 2005). 
Numerous studies, such as Moreno and Trehan (1997), Conley and Ligon (2002), 
Ramirez and Loboguerrero (2002), and Le Gallo (2004), have applied spatial 
econometric techniques to traditional models of income convergence and have found 
strong evidence that the income growth of a country is dependent upon the income 
growth of neighboring countries.  Even more relevant to the current study is the work of 
Rey and Montouri (1999), who have generated new insights concerning the geographical 
features of state income growth and on the role of geography in the econometric analysis 
of state income convergence.  We extend recent work by Scully (1991) and Annala 
(2003) on fiscal policy convergence in much the same way that Rey and Montouri (1999) 
extended the literature dealing with income convergence among U.S. states.  
The study of converging state and local government fiscal policies is a 
straightforward extension of traditional income convergence studies.  The growth model 
by Solow (1956) implies that the growth rates of tax revenue and government 
expenditures are equal to the growth rate of income under the assumption that taxes are a 
constant proportion of output.
3  Based on the Solow growth model and the finding of 
                                                 
3 In reality, taxes and expenditures are not a constant portion of income.  However, there is relatively little 
variability over time.  For example, U.S. Federal government revenues have averaged 18.5 percent of GDP 
between 1977 and 2002, with a standard deviation of 0.95 percent.  At the state and local level, revenues to  4 
state income convergence by previous studies, it is a reasonable hypothesis that state 
fiscal policies are also converging. 
Based on a public-choice model, Scully (1991) has examined this hypothesis.  In 
contrast to a Tiebout (1956) model in which migration reinforces the differences in local 
fiscal regimes, migration contributes to the convergence of fiscal regimes in Scully’s 
model.  The theory is straightforward, beginning with the idea that migration contributes 
to a convergence of incomes across regions.  Assuming that voter preferences for net 
public income transfers do not differ across regions, fiscal regimes will converge 
spatially as incomes converge.  Empirically, Scully finds that the spatial convergence of 
total state and local taxes coincides with the spatial convergence of per capita incomes 
across states. 
Recently, Annala (2003) has extended the empirical portion of Scully’s (1991) 
analysis by examining the convergence of several state and local fiscal policy variables 
(revenue sources and expenditure categories) over the period 1977 to 1996.   He finds 
strong support for state fiscal policy convergence – most expenditure and revenue 
categories grew at a greater rate in those states having a lower initial level of expenditure 
and revenue.  For example, Annala (2003) finds that the growth rate in total state and 
local tax revenue and expenditures have been converging at roughly 4.8 percent and 4.0 
percent a year, respectively.  
In this paper we extend the work of Scully (1991) and Annala (2003) by 
considering spatial dependence in models of state and local fiscal policy convergence.  
Our spatial econometric models follow those used by Rey and Montouri (1999) in their 
                                                                                                                                                 
state and local governments have averaged 9.6 percent of gross domestic product between 1977 and 2002, 
with a standard deviation of 0.5 percent.  5 
study of state income convergence.  Because spatial dependence has been found in 
traditional models of income growth, it is reasonable to believe that growth in state and 
local fiscal policy is also correlated across states.  Citizen preference for taxation and 
government services, while certainly different at an individual level, are not dependent 
upon the location of a state or local government boundary.  This notion is empirically 
supported by Case et al. (1993) who find evidence that the level of per capita government 
expenditures in a state is positively related to the level of government expenditures in 
neighboring states.  In addition, unobserved regional shocks to government revenues and 
expenditures suggest spatial correlation in the error structure of convergence models. 
Applying spatial econometrics to models of state fiscal policy convergence can 
offer new insights into the behavior of long run fiscal policy growth.  First, the presence 
of spatial dependence suggests that earlier estimates of rates of state fiscal policy 
convergence may be biased unless spatial effects are incorporated into the analysis.  In 
addition to reducing bias, a greater efficiency of coefficient estimates can be obtained if 
spatial correlation is considered (Anselin, 1988).  Second, the potential for spatial 
dependence in long run state fiscal policy growth will provide evidence on how these 
fiscal policies interact over time.  In particular, evidence of spatial dependence suggests 
that states’ fiscal policies are not converging independently of each other’s but rather 
display similar paths because of strategic interaction or common responses to regional 
shocks.  From this we can gain insights that contribute to the literature on tax competition 
and intergovernmental competition in general (Kanbur and Keen, 1993; Besley and Case, 
1995; Wilson, 1991, 1999; Hernandez-Murillo, 2003; Bailey et al., 2004).
4  
                                                 
4 In a recent survey Brueckner (2003) illustrates the use of spatial econometrics models to analyze strategic 
interaction among different governmental units.  6 
Data and Empirical Methodology 
  We use data for each of the 48 contiguous states for 1977 and 2002.
5   Gross state 
product and the nine fiscal policy variables enumerated in Table 1 are in real per capita 
dollars and encompass both state and local governments unless specified otherwise.
6  All 
state and local government tax and expenditure data were obtained from the U.S. Bureau 
of the Census, Federal, State, and Local Government Division.  Gross state product data 
were obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
[Table 1 about here] 
  Preliminary evidence on converging or diverging state and local fiscal policies 
can be generated by computing the coefficient of variation for each fiscal policy variable 
for the initial year and the ending year.  The coefficient of variation reflects dispersion 
from the mean and can be used to compare the degree of inequality for each fiscal policy 
variable in the two years, with each year having a different mean.
7  A smaller coefficient 
of variation in 2002 compared to 1977 suggests a converging policy, whereas a larger 
coefficient of variation in 2002 suggests a diverging policy.   
  The computed coefficients of variation, shown in Table 2, reveal that total tax 
revenues and expenditures as well as most broad categories of taxes and expenditures 
have been converging over the sample period.  For example, the coefficient of variation 
                                                 
5 Annala (2003) used data on all 50 states for 1977 and 1996.  We ignore Alaska and Hawaii because they 
have very unique economies.  States with no state sales tax (Alaska, Delaware, Oregon, New Hampshire, 
and Montana) are excluded from the analysis of sales tax convergence (n=44).  The states with no state 
personal income tax (Florida, Nevada, South Dakota, Texas, Washington and Wyoming) are omitted from 
the analysis of income tax convergence (n=42).  The results were similar when New Hampshire and 
Tennessee (state personal income tax on dividend and interest only) were omitted from the analysis. 
6 Real gross state product is in chained 2000 dollars, while all fiscal policy variables have been deflated 
using the consumer price index, whose base is 1982-1984=100. 
7 The coefficient of variation for gross state product and each fiscal policy variable is computed as: 
20 . 5
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CV FP FP FP
=
=− ∑  where FP denotes the fiscal policy variable as well as, to simplify the 
notation, gross state product.  7 
for total tax revenues declined from 0.22 in 1977 to 0.18 in 2002, while the coefficient of 
variation for total expenditures declined from 0.18 in 1977 to 0.14 in 2002.  With respect 
to broad categories of taxes and expenditures, public welfare expenditures and income 
tax revenue (for those states having state income taxes) have become less diverse across 
states over time, followed by education expenditures and highway expenditures.  The 
coefficient of variation for sales tax and gross receipts revenue (for those states having a 
state sales tax) is virtually identical for 1977 and 2002.  Only health and hospital 
expenditures appear to be diverging over the sample period.
8  Finally, the coefficient of 
variation of gross state product has declined only slightly, thus suggesting little 
convergence between 1977 and 2002. 
[Table 2 about here] 
Empirical Methodology 
  Although the coefficients of variation provide initial insights into the convergence 
of state and local fiscal policies over time, traditional regression methods are better suited 
to obtaining estimates on the speed of convergence as well as incorporating spatial 
dependence.  Our empirical methodology is presented below. 
  For each state, we calculate the average annual percent change (YFP) in gross state 
product and each fiscal policy variable (FP) as: 
YFP  = [ln(FP/pop)2002 – ln(FP/pop)1977]/T 
                                                 
8 Our results differ from Merriman and Skidmore (2002), who found that the coefficient of variation in per 
capita state government health care spending declined between 1988 and 1998.  We found an increase in 
the coefficient of variation between 1988 and 1998.  The difference appears to be due to what is included in 
health care spending.  Following Annala (2003), we use the hospitals and health categories of social 
services and income maintenance spending, while Merriman and Skidmore (2002) have also included 
medical vendor payments.  A second difference is that Merriman and Skidmore (2002) use state 
government expenditures, while we also include local government expenditures.  8 
where T is the number of time periods and pop is state population.  We then use this 
variable as the dependent variable in the following  -convergence: 
          (1) 
where the (unconditional) speed of convergence or divergence for each fiscal policy 
variable is determined by the sign and magnitude of 1.
9  
  As discussed in the introduction, the existence of spatial dependence can create 
bias and efficiency problems for estimates of 1 based on a standard ordinary least 
squares regression.  The general spatial econometric model (Anselin, 1988) allows for 
potential spatial correlation in both the dependent variable (fiscal policy growth in this 
case) and the error term.  The spatial econometric model does not induce cross-sectional 
correlation if none is present; it simply provides an established and flexible framework 
for relaxing the assumption of cross-sectional correlation with regard to a model's 
dependent variable and/or error term.  As Anselin (1988) notes, unlike time-series 
correlation that is one dimensional, spatial correlation in cross-sectional models is multi-
dimensional in that it depends upon all contiguous or influential units of observations (in 
this case states).  Incorporating spatial effects into the convergence model presented 
earlier gives the following spatial econometric model, specified in matrix notation: 
                                                 
9 The st￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿-convergence has been criticized for several reasons.  Quah (1993) notes that 
implicit in the empirical specification is the idea that each economy has a steady-state growth path that 
follows a time trend.  He provides cross-county evidence on income growth that refutes this assumption.  
Durlauf (2001) points to several problems inherent in traditional convergence models, such as the potential 
for spillover effects and nonlinearities, a disconnect between growth theory and empirical modeling (i.e., 
which variables should be included in growth models and how the potential problem of simultaneity 
between these variables should be handled), and, finally, heterogeneous parameters (i.e., the marginal 
change in a variable may produce different effects in very different countries).  We recognize the potential 
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿-convergence, but we argue that differences across states in terms 
of heterogeneous parameters and different growth paths is likely to be significantly less than across 
countries due to the fact that political systems and components of government revenue and spending are 
much more similar across states than across countries.  In addition, we account for spillover effects in our 
empirical model, thereby addressing a concern of Durlauf (2001). 
0 1 1977 FP YF P ββ ε =+ + 9 
0 1 1977 FP FP ββ ρ =+ + + YF P W Y ε         (2a)                                                  
λ =+ εε ν W                     (2b)                     
The spatial lag component is given by WYFP, where W denotes the exogenous 
(N×N) spatial weights matrix.  The scalarρ is the spatial lag, or spatial autoregressive, 
coefficient that must be estimated.  Positive spatial correlation in fiscal policy growth 
exists if ρ > 0, negative spatial correlation exists ifρ < 0, and no spatial correlation exists 
ifρ = 0.
10   The spatial error component of the model is given by λ =+ W εε ν , where  is 
a (N×1) vector of error terms, W is the same (N×N) spatial weights matrix as in equation 





must be estimated.   
The errors are positively correlated if   
  
    
 
    Spatial error correlation can result from omitted variables, 
including spatially weighted independent variables and a spatial lag, and unobserved 
spatial heterogeneity in the error structure (Anselin, 1988).  Note that if there is no spatial 
correlation in the dependent variable or the error structure, then ρ       
spatial model reduces to the standard ordinary least squares regression model.   Typically, 
spatial lag and spatial error models are estimated separately to avoid possible 
identification problems (Anselin, 1988).  In models of strategic interaction among 
governments, the spatial lag parameter is usually interpreted as the slope of the reaction 
function.  Brueckner (2003) indicated that strategic interaction may correspond to several 
interpretations of the underlying game among governments, including models of tax 
                                                 
10 Generally, when a spatial weights matrix is row-standardized, the values for the spatial correlation 
coefficients are smaller than 1 and larger than the inverse of the smallest eigenvalue of the weights matrix.  
See Anselin (1995).  10 
competition and yardstick competition.  Spatial correlation in the error term, on the other 
hand, can be interpreted as reflecting states’ common reaction to shocks because of 
omitted variables that are spatially correlated, such as topographical features.
11 
Since the spatial lag term in Equation (2a) is correlated with the error term and the 
spatial error component is also non-spherical, estimating equations (2a) and (2b) by 
ordinary least squares will result in biased, inconsistent, and inefficient parameter 
estimates (Anselin, 1988).  Assuming the random component of the spatial error (ν ) is 
homoskedastic and jointly normally distributed, Equations (2a) and (2b) can be estimated 
by maximum likelihood.
12,13 
The elements of the spatial weights matrix (W) are generally specified a priori.  
The elements of W commonly reflect a measure of contiguity or distance between units 
of observation.  The most common weights matrix in the growth literature (and the 
applied spatial econometrics literature in general) is the binary contiguity matrix (Cliff 
and Ord, 1981; Anselin, 1988).  In this representation, the individual elements of W, 
denoted ij, are set equal to unity if observations i and j (i j) share a common border, 
and are set to zero otherwise.  The limitations of this specification are that all neighboring 
observations are assumed to have equal influence and any spatial correlations beyond 
common-border neighbors are ignored.   
                                                 
11 In the models surveyed by Brueckener (2003), the spatial lag model is used to estimate reaction functions 
in strategic games of tax or yardstick competition among governments.  Ignoring spatial correlation in the 
error term in this case may provide false evidence of strategic interaction. 
12 See Anselin (1988) for a description of the likelihood function for the spatial lag and spatial error 
models.  We use programs in James P. LeSage’s Econometrics Toolbox to run the spatial models.  The 
programs can be found at: www.spatial-econometrics.com.     
13 As an alternative to maximum likelihood, Kelejian and Prucha (1998) suggest a method based on 
instrumental variables that yields a consistent estimate of ρ  even in the presence of spatial error 
dependence.  This method traditionally uses the independent variables and their spatial lags as instruments.  
We chose not use this method in our final estimations because, in our case, the sole independent variable 
corresponding to the initial values of the fiscal policies turned out to be a poor instrument for the spatial lag 
of the growth rate.   11 
  It is not clear, however, that geography is the most relevant factor in capturing 
spatial dependence in long run fiscal policy growth.  States may formulate their fiscal 
policies based not only on the behavior of their neighbors, but also on the policies of 
states sharing similar economic or demographic characteristics regardless of their 
proximity.  Although choosing weights matrices is somewhat arbitrary (Case et al, 1993), 
we have chosen three weights matrices that are likely to best capture spatial correlation in 
state policy decisions.
14  We therefore follow Case et al. (1993) and specify three 
different weights matrices, one based on proximity (border) and economics (income), and 
two based on proximity (border) and demographics (percent of population that is black or 










Each element of W
G is equal to one divided by the number of borders state i shares if 
states i and j share a common border.  Individual elements of W
I are equal to 1/|incomei – 
incomej|j1/|incomei – incomej|) where incomei is real per capita income in state i.  
Elements of W
R equal 1/|blacki – blackj| j1/|blacki – blackj|), where blacki is the 
proportion of state i’s population that is black, and the elements of W
A are equal to 
1/|agedi – agedj| j1/|agedi – agedj|), where agedi is the proportion of state i’s population 
that is aged 65 years or older.
15  The elements along the diagonal of each weights matrix 
(i=j) are set to zero by convention.  T   is determined by a grid-search of log-
likelihoods (0    1).  Each weights matrix collapses to the standard contiguity matrix 
                                                 
14￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿  
15 We use the 1976 value for incomei, blacki , and agedi . Using 1977 values would render each weights 
matrix endogenous.  12 
(W
G) 
   .  A finding of  1 suggests that economics or demographics defines a 
spatial neighbor better than contiguity. 
 
Empirical Results 
  For gross state product and each of the fiscal policy variables, we estimate one 
ordinary least squares model and three spatial autoregressive (SAR) and spatial error 
(SEM) models using each of the spatial weights matrices described earlier.
16  Our 
regression results are shown in Table 3.
17 
[Table 3 about here] 
Evidence of Fiscal Policy Convergence 
  The results support several general conclusions regarding state and local fiscal 
policy convergence, most of which are consistent with Annala (2003).
18  The regression 
results present strong evidence that state and local fiscal policies have been converging.  
Our estimated speeds of convergence are less, however, than those obtained by Annala 
(2003).  In addition to our inclusion of spatial effects, this is likely due to the fact that our 
sample period extends to 2002, which includes the recent 2001 recession.  As shown in 
Owyang et al. (2005), both the timing and the magnitude of the 2001 recession were not 
homogenous across the states – many states entered their own recession prior to the 
official National Bureau of Economic Research start date for the U.S. recession (March 
                                                 
16 We also estimated a model that included the spatially-weighted fiscal policy variable, i.e. WFP1977, to 
capture the possibility that long run fiscal policy growth in a state is a function of the initial level of fiscal 
policy in neighboring states.  The coefficient on this variable was not statistically significant for any of the 
nine fiscal policies, thus we chose to omit this variable from our final models. 
17 The results shown in Table 3 are the log-likelihood maximizing results from a grid search of all possible 
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿
provided a large amount of output, which will gladly be provided upon request. 
18 We also estimated our models using the 1977 to 1996 sample period of Annala (2003).  The spatial 
econometric results using this shorter sampler period are very similar to those presented here, and the 
conclusions regarding fiscal policy convergence are generally consistent with those of Annala (2003).  13 
2001) and exited the recession after the official ending date (November 2001).  This was 
especially true for the traditionally poorer states of the south.  Thus, extended periods of 
negative income growth, revenue growth, and expenditure growth, especially in poorer 
states, can explain a greater divergence (or less convergence) in these later years. 
  Regardless of the regression model, the results indicate that seven of the nine 
variables we study are converging over the sample period.  For two fiscal policy 
variables, sales taxes and gross receipts and health and hospital expenditures, the 
evidence for convergence is, at best, weak.  For these variables the estimate of 1 is 
always negative, but statistically significant relationships are found only for the 
autoregressive models for sales taxes and gross receipts and are not found for any of the 
models using health and hospital expenditures.  Annala (2003) obtains similar results for 
sales taxes and health expenditures over the period 1977 and 1996.  Like Annala (2003), 
we find that none of the fiscal policy variables have been diverging over the sample 
period.   
  For the seven fiscal policies that have been converging, the speed of convergence 
is similar across all seven regression models, although the speed of convergence is often 
slightly less, on average, when spatial effects are considered.   For example, if we 
consider total tax revenue, the ordinary least squares model suggests a speed of 
convergence of about 1.3 percent a year, whereas the average annual speed of 
convergence of the spatial models ranges from 1.0 percent to 1.2 percent. 
Comparing the average speed of convergence based on the spatial models for the 
broad categories of fiscal policies, it appears that public welfare expenditures have had 
the greatest speed of convergence – roughly 2.6 percent a year.  Highway and education  14 
expenditures round out the top three fastest converging fiscal policies, each having had 
average speeds of convergence of 1.8 percent.  The fiscal policy with the lowest 
statistically significant average speeds of convergence is property tax revenue (roughly 
0.7 percent a year).
19  
  Finally, it is interesting to compare the speed of convergence of gross state 
product (a measure of output) and several government fiscal policy variables.  We find 
that, on average, gross state product has been converging at a rate of roughly 1.2 percent 
a year.  In comparison, total expenditures have had a speed of convergence of about 1.5 
percent a year and total tax revenue has had a speed of convergence of about 1.1 percent 
a year.  These statistics reveal that total expenditures have been converging faster than 
output and that total tax revenues have been converging slightly slower than output.  This 
broadly suggests that state governments, especially those with lower initial levels of 
general expenditures, have been increasing expenditures faster than the average rate of 
economic growth.  It also appears that the driving force behind this rate of growth is 
public welfare expenditure that, of all government expenditure variables, has had the 
greatest speed of convergence. 
 
Evidence of Fiscal Policy Dependence 
While the literature on intergovernmental competition mainly focuses on spatial 
dependence in short-run state or local government policies that arise out of action-
reaction type responses by competing governments, our models better demonstrate the 
long-run effect of interstate competition.  The first result is that in six of the nine cases 
                                                 
19 Although property taxes are predominately a decision of local governments, state governments often 
legislate restrictions and other laws on local property taxes, such as assessment rates, revenue caps, etc.     15 
the estimated spatial models show significant improvements in the value of the log-
likelihood functions relative to the models estimated by ordinary least squares, as shown 
by the Likelihood Ratio tests in Table 3.
20  We find evidence of significant spatial error 
correlation in eight of the nine fiscal policy variables (not total expenditures) and 
significant spatial dependence in seven of the nine fiscal policies variables (not total 
expenditures or highway expenditures).  The estimated speed of convergence is also 
slightly lower in the spatial econometric models than the ordinary least squares model, 
suggesting that the latter model, because it ignores spatial correlation in the dependent 
variable, produces estimates that are biased upward (Anselin, 1988).  Although the 
difference in most cases is only a few tenths of a percentage point, the cumulative effect 
in terms of long-run growth could be quite large. 
Before discussing the spatial econometric results in detail, it is necessary to first 
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regressions.  We find that both the spatial error and spatial lag coefficients are 
statistically significant for the majority of fiscal policy variables.
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20 Such results also exist for our analysis of Gross State Product. 
21 Recall that we estimate the SAR and SEM models separately due to possible identification problems 
(Anselin, 1988).  16 
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of the spatial error effect is due to the omitted spatially weighted dependent variable.   
Although the spatial error estimates relative to the spatial lag estimates suggest 
some degree of spatial error correlation, which may be masquerading as strategic 
interaction, it was not possible to disentangle the source of the spatial effects using 
diagnostic tests as in Anselin et al. (1996).
22  A more specific interpretation of our 
general spatial results is that the finding of spatial dependence indicates that the growth 
paths of state and local fiscal policies are not independent.  To illustrate the effects on 
long run policy growth, the remaining discussion of the empirical results will focus on 
the SAR models. 
  &   
    	 e find that a one percentage point average increase 
in neighboring states’ gross state product growth will increase a state’s average annual 
gross state product growth by 0.37 percentage points.  Similarly, a one percentage point 
average increase in neighboring states’ total tax revenue growth will increase a state’s 
average annual tax revenue growth by roughly 0.38 percent.   Finally, a one percentage 
point average increase in neighboring states’ total expenditure growth does not appear to 
have a statistically significant effect on a state’s average total expenditure growth.  
Again, our results do not reveal the direct effects of action-reaction types of policy 
competition across states, but rather they demonstrate the long-run effect of such 
competition. 
  The results also provide insights into the broad categories of fiscal policies that 
are the most correlated in a spatial sense across states and those that are not correlated 
across states.  One general finding is that spatial correlation is much more prevalent for 
                                                 
22 Also see footnote #13.  17 
revenue categories than for expenditure categories.  In fact, we find spatial error 
correlation and spatial dependence using all three weights matrices when we use total tax 
revenue.  In contrast, we find no statistically significant spatial correlation for total 
expenditures. 
Turning to separate categories, property tax revenue has the greatest degree of 
correlation across states – a one percentage point average increase in neighboring states’ 
property tax revenue growth will increase a state’s property tax revenue growth by 0.56 
percent.  One explanation for this finding is that property values are similar within 
geographic regions but differ across regions (Baffoe-Bonnie, 1998).  This fact, coupled 
with the trend in the devolution of government services and the fact that property tax 
revenue is the primary revenue source for local governments across the country (Fisher, 
1996), can explain the relatively large degree of spatial dependence in property tax 
revenue.  It is also interesting to note that while property tax revenues have the greatest 
degree of spatial dependence across states, the speed at which they are converging is the 
slowest (about 0.7 percent a year) of all fiscal policy variables having a statistically 
significant 1.  This finding likely reflects the growing dispersion in home values across 
different regions of the country (e.g., Midwest versus the east and west coasts).
23  
  We find little evidence that health and hospital expenditures are spatially 
correlated.  Health expenditures are likely to be based on the health needs of each state’s 
population.  It is more difficult for a state to change its health expenditures when its 
population and its health needs are relatively constant one year to the next.  States may 
thus find it more difficult to spend more on health than is needed by its population. 
                                                 
23 See the house price index, by Census region, produced by the Office of Federal Housing and Oversight 
(http://www.ofheo.gov/HPIRegion.asp).  18 
Several interesting conclusions can also be made regarding the spatial weights 
matrix that best captures (in terms of maximizing the log-likelihood) the nature of spatial 
dependence in each fiscal policy variable.  An especially interesting result is that 
contiguity is, by far, the key factor in capturing the spatial dependence in the revenue 
variables.  In the vast majority of cases for the revenue variables we find th  
 
suggests that contiguity is the exclusive factor in the construction of the weights matrix.  
For the expenditure variables, however, income, race, and age are useful in capturing the 
spatial correlation.  Proximity continues to play a role, but to a lesser degree than it did 
for the revenue variables.  This suggests that economic growth (measured by gross state 
product) and the revenue streams based on economic growth (e.g. income tax revenue, 
sales tax revenue, etc.) are a function of economic growth in neighboring states, 
regardless of whether these states share similar economic and demographic 
characteristics.   
For the majority of expenditure variables, with education expenditures being the 
exception, we find that economic and/or demographic similarities across the states play a 
role in capturing the spatial correlation.  The proximity of the states to one another still 
matters in many cases, but certainly not to the extent it matters for the revenue variables.  
For example, the spatial dependence of public welfare expenditures depends relatively 
more on income and demographics than on proximity.  On the other hand, proximity 
matters more than income and demographics in terms of capturing spatial dependence in 
education expenditures across states.      
In sum, there is strong evidence that expenditure growth in a state is dependent 
upon the expenditure growth in economically and demographically similar states,  19 
regardless of the states’ location to each other.  Economic growth and tax revenue growth 
in a state, however, appear to be most dependent upon the economic growth and tax 
revenue growth in contiguous states regardless of their specific economic and 
demographic similarities. 
 
Summary and Conclusions 
  We have contributed to the empirical literature on fiscal policy convergence by 
extending the traditional convergence model to allow for spatial correlation across states.  
Specifically, we apply the spatial econometric techniques used in studies of income 
growth to a model of long run state and local fiscal policy growth.  Of the nine fiscal 
policies examined in this study, we find strong evidence that seven of the nine have been 
converging over the period 1977 to 2002.  Speeds of convergence range from about 0.7 
percent a year for property tax revenue to 2.6 percent a year for public welfare 
expenditures.  We also find that total tax revenues have been converging slightly slower 
than output and that total government expenditures have been converging faster than 
output.  This latter point suggests that poorer states have been increasing government 
expenditures faster than the average rate of economic growth. 
  While our results are supportive of previous results on state and local fiscal policy 
convergence, we do find that our estimates are somewhat smaller in magnitude.  Two 
explanations for this finding are: 1) the time period our analysis covers includes the 2001 
recession where economic growth and government revenues and expenditures slowed 
considerably, yet unequally across the states, and 2) the inclusion of spatial dependence 
in the model reduces the potential for bias.  20 
  We find strong evidence that long run state and local fiscal policy growth in one 
state is a function of long run of fiscal policy growth in neighboring states.  For example, 
we find that a one percentage point average increase in neighboring states’ total tax 
revenue growth will increase a state’s average annual tax revenue growth by roughly 0.38 
percent.   Of all the fiscal policies we studied, property tax revenue growth exhibits the 
greatest degree of spatial dependence, with a spatial lag coefficient of 0.56.  We argue 
this finding reflects the increasing nationwide role local governments have taken relative 
to state governments in providing goods and services. 
  Our analysis also considered several different source of spatial influence – 
geography, economics, and demographics.  Many of the spatial lag and spatial error 
coefficients in each set of fiscal policy models are statistically significant regardless of 
which weighting scheme is used.  However, we find that the spatial effects for state 
revenue policies are generally different than for expenditure policies.  Specifically, 
expenditure growth in a state is dependent upon the expenditure growth in economically 
and demographically similar states, regardless of the states’ locations to one another.  
However, output growth and revenue growth in a state appears to be most dependent on 
the output growth and revenue growth in contiguous states regardless of their specific 
economic and demographic similarities.  This likely reflects the notion that states who 
share a common border are more likely to have economies and revenue streams that are 
similarly affected by changes in economic conditions, whereas state expenditures, the 
bulk of which is education and public welfare, are more a function of the income and 
demographic characteristics of each state.  21 
  Future research could explore the possibility of spatial clusters (Rey and Janikas, 
2005).  One approach to doing so is that the spatial econometric models could be 
modified to allow the spatial lag and spatial error coefficients to differ by geographic 
region, thus providing insights into how long run fiscal policy growth may differ by 
region.  Similarly, it would be of interest to explore whether the degree of spatial 
dependence in fiscal policy growth changes over time.  This may have relevance for the 
political business cycle literature.  Finally, there is an opportunity for future research to 
better identify differences in both speeds of convergence and spatial dependence during 
recessionary periods versus periods of economic growth.    22 
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Table 1 – State and Local Fiscal Policy Variables 
 
Gross State Product 
Total Tax Revenue 
Property Tax Revenue 
Sales Tax and Gross Receipts Revenue 
Income Tax Revenue 
Total Expenditures 
Education Expenditures 
Health and Hospital Expenditures 
Highway Expenditures 
Public Welfare Expenditures 
Note:  Each variable represents state and local governments, unless specified otherwise.  Data for each 
variable are from 1977 and 2002.  All state and local government tax and expenditure data were obtained 
from the U.S. Bureau of the Census, Federal, State, and Local Government Division. Gross State Product 
(GSP) was obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.    26 
 
Table 2:  Coefficients of Variation – Fiscal Policies 
 
Variable 1977  2002 
Gross State Product  0.19  0.18 
Total Tax Revenue  0.22  0.18 
Property Tax Revenue  0.44  0.39 
Sales Tax and Gross Receipts Revenue  0.28  0.29 
Income Tax Revenue  0.57  0.45 
Total Expenditures  0.18  0.14 
Education Expenditures  0.16  0.12 
Health and Hospital Expenditures  0.27  0.41 
Highway Expenditures  0.37  0.29 
Public Welfare Expenditures  0.43  0.26 
Notes:  A smaller coefficient of variation in 2002 compared to 1977 suggests convergence, whereas a larger coefficient 
of variation in 2002 compared to 1977 suggests divergence.  See footnote #7 in the text for a description of how the 
coefficient of variation was calculated.  All variables are in real per capita dollars and represent state and local 
governments, unless specified otherwise.  Number of observations for each variable was 48 except for income tax 
revenue (n=42) and sales tax revenue (n=44). 




Table 3:  Fiscal Policy Convergence - Empirical Results 
                          
Dependent Variable:  Real Gross State Product average annual growth, 1977-2002 
Model  β1  λ  ρ  α  No. Obs.  Log-likelihood  LR stat 
OLS -0.0121***        48  188.56     
SEM (Wrace) -0.0130***  0.4860***    0  48  193.51  9.90*** 
SAR (Wrace) -0.0115***    0.3740**  0  48  191.88  6.64*** 
SEM (Wincome) -0.0130***  0.4860***    0  48  193.51  9.90*** 
SAR (Wincome) -0.0115***    0.3740**  0  48  191.88  6.64*** 
SEM (Wage) -0.0130***  0.486***    0  48  193.51  9.90*** 
SAR (Wage) -0.0115***      0.3740**  0  48  191.88  6.63** 
                  
Dependent Variable:  Total Tax Revenue average annual growth, 1977-2002 
Model  β1  λ  ρ  α  No. Obs.  Log-likelihood  LR stat 
OLS -0.0127***        48  199.99     
SEM (Wrace) -0.0120***  0.4460***    0  48  203.42  6.86*** 
SAR (Wrace) -0.0098***    0.3800***  0  48  202.93  5.88** 
SEM (Wincome) -0.0120***  0.4460***    0  48  203.42  6.86*** 
SAR (Wincome) -0.0098***    0.3800***  0  48  202.93  5.88** 
SEM (Wage) -0.0120***  0.4460***    0  48  203.42  6.84*** 
SAR (Wage) -0.0098***      0.3800***  0  48  202.93  5.86** 
                  
Dependent Variable:  Property Tax Revenue average annual growth, 1977-2002 
Model  β1  λ  ρ  α  No. Obs.  Log-likelihood  LR stat 
OLS -0.0105***        48  164.15     
SEM (Wrace) -0.0080***  0.5850***    0  48  170.09  11.88*** 
SAR (Wrace) -0.0067***    0.5630***  0  48  170.43  12.56*** 
SEM (Wincome) -0.0080***  0.5850***    0  48  170.09  11.88*** 
SAR (Wincome) -0.0067***    0.5630***  0  48  170.43  12.56*** 
SEM (Wage) -0.0080***  0.5850***    0  48  170.09  11.87*** 
SAR (Wage) -0.0067***      0.5630***  0  48  170.43  12.56*** 
                  
Dependent Variable:  Sales Tax and Gross Receipts Revenue average annual growth, 1977-2002 
Model  β1  λ  ρ  α  No. Obs.  Log-likelihood  LR stat 
OLS -0.0043        44  175.97     
SEM (Wrace) -0.0041  0.4370***    0  44  178.58  5.22** 
SAR (Wrace) -0.0044*    0.4479***  0  44  179.57  7.20*** 
SEM (Wincome) -0.0041  0.4370***    0  44  178.58  5.22** 
SAR (Wincome) -0.0044*    0.4479***  0  44  179.57  7.20*** 
SEM (Wage) -0.0038  0.5490***    0.25  44  178.69  5.44** 
SAR (Wage) -0.0043*      0.5589***  0.25  44  179.76  7.57*** 
                  
Dependent Variable:  Income Tax Revenue average annual growth, 1977-2002 
Model  β1  λ  ρ  α  No. Obs.  Log-likelihood  LR stat 
OLS -0.0135***        42  128.06     
SEM (Wrace) -0.0133***  0.1020    0  42  128.22  0.32 
SAR (Wrace) -0.0129***    0.1490  0  42  128.41  0.70 
SEM (Wincome) -0.0127***  -0.3650    1  42  128.88  1.64 
SAR (Wincome) -0.0148***    -0.3960*  1  42  129.34  2.56 
SEM (Wage) -0.0133***  -0.8390*    1  42  129.29  2.46 
SAR (Wage) -0.0136***      -0.8140*  1  42  129.31  2.49 
                   28 
Table 3:  Fiscal Policy Convergence - Empirical Results (continued) 
 
Dependent Variable:  Total Expenditures average annual growth, 1977-2002 
Model  β1  λ  ρ  α  No. Obs.  Log-likelihood  LR stat 
OLS -0.0155***        48  207.64     
SEM (Wrace) -0.0154***  0.2210    0.5  48  207.98  0.68 
SAR (Wrace) -0.0150***    0.1630  0.5  48  207.91  0.54 
SEM (Wincome) -0.0155***  0.1780    0.25  48  207.90  0.52 
SAR (Wincome) -0.0148***    0.1030  0  48  207.84  0.40 
SEM (Wage) -0.0150***  -0.3760    1  48  207.89  0.49 
SAR (Wage) -0.0146***      -0.721  1  48  208.63  1.97 
                  
Dependent Variable:  Education Expenditures average annual growth, 1977-2002 
Model  β1  λ  ρ  α  No. Obs.  Log-likelihood  LR stat 
OLS -0.0201***        48  205.77     
SEM (Wrace)  -0.0187***  0.2920*   0  48 207.04  2.54 
SAR (Wrace) -0.0167***    0.2600*  0  48  207.34  3.14* 
SEM (Wincome)  -0.0189***  0.3710*   0.25  48 207.08  2.61 
SAR (Wincome) -0.0167***    0.2600*  0  48  207.34  3.14* 
SEM (Wage)  -0.0187***  0.2920*   0  48 207.04  2.54 
SAR (Wage) -0.0167***      0.2600*  0  48  207.34  3.15* 
                  
Dependent Variable:  Health and Hospital Expenditures average annual growth, 1977-2002 
Model  β1  λ  ρ  α  No. Obs.  Log-likelihood  LR stat 
OLS -0.0024        48  137.28     
SEM (Wrace)  -0.0082 0.3440*   1  48 138.05  1.54 
SAR (Wrace) -0.0042    0.2440  1  48  137.77  0.98 
SEM (Wincome)  -0.0011 -0.0740   0  48 137.35  0.14 
SAR (Wincome) -0.0016    -0.0740  0  48  137.36  0.16 
SEM (Wage)  -0.0013 -0.2090   0.75  48 137.39  0.22 
SAR (Wage) -0.0017      -0.2110  0.75  48  137.40  0.25 
                  
Dependent Variable:  Highway Expenditures average annual growth, 1977-2002 
Model  β1  λ  ρ  α  No. Obs.  Log-likelihood  LR stat 
OLS -0.0174***        48  170.16     
SEM (Wrace) -0.0165***  -0.3200    1  48  170.90  1.48 
SAR (Wrace) -0.0184***    -0.3060  1  48  171.51  2.7 
SEM (Wincome)  -0.0185*** -0.6530***   1  48  173.21  6.10** 
SAR (Wincome) -0.0179***    -0.3860*  1  48  171.60  2.88* 
SEM (Wage) -0.0182***  0.5900**    1  48  171.52  2.71* 
SAR (Wage) -0.0178***      0.3720  1  48  170.59  0.84 
                  
Dependent Variable:  Public Welfare Expenditures average annual growth, 1977-2002 
Model  β1  λ  ρ  α  No. Obs.  Log-likelihood  LR stat 
OLS -0.0261***        48  161.73     
SEM (Wrace)  -0.0256*** -0.7930***   0.75  48  164.48  5.50** 
SAR (Wrace) -0.0271***    -0.3840*  0.5  48  163.41  3.36* 
SEM (Wincome) -0.0257***  -0.2720    0  48  162.44  1.42 
SAR (Wincome) -0.0242***    0.2960*  1  48  163.30  3.14* 
SEM (Wage) -0.0257***  -0.2720    0  48  162.44  1.41 
SAR (Wage) -0.0284***      -0.9940***  0.75  48  164.89  6.33** 
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%.  All regressions were estimated with a constant term, not reported.  
SEM is the spatial error model and SAR is the spatial autoregressive model.  All variables are in real per capita terms and refer to state 
and local governments, unless specified otherwise.  An ￿ = 0 reveals the contiguity weights matrix is used, an  0￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
weights matrix is a linear combination of contiguity and income, race or age, and an ￿ = 1 reveals that only the income, race, or age 
weights matrix is used.  See text for description of weights matrices, Wrace, Wincome, and Wage and of the weighting coefficient α.   29 
 